We consider a multi-user variant of the private information retrieval problem described as follows. Suppose there are D users, each of which wants to privately retrieve a distinct message from a server with the help of a trusted agent. We assume that the agent has a subset of M messages whose indices are unknown to the server. The goal of the agent is to collectively retrieve the users' requests from the server. For this problem, we introduce the notion of individual-privacy -the agent is required to protect the privacy only for each individual user (but may leak some correlations among user requests). We refer to this problem as Individually-Private Information Retrieval with Side Information (IPIR-SI).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the conventional Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem, a user wants to privately download a message belonging to a database with copies stored on a single or multiple remote servers (see [1] ). The multiple-server PIR problem has been predominantly studied in the PIR literature, with breakthrough results for the informationtheoretic privacy model in the past few years (see e.g., [2] - [5] , and references therein). The multi-message extension of the PIR problem enables a user to privately download multiple messages from the server(s) [6] , [7] . There have been a number of recent works on the PIR problem when some side information is present at the user [7] - [11] .
Recently, in [12] , [13] , the authors considered the singleserver PIR with Side Information (PIR-SI) problem, wherein the user knows a random subset of messages whose indices are unknown to the server. It was shown that the side information enables the user to substantially reduce the download cost and still achieve information-theoretic privacy for the requested message. The multi-message version of PIR-SI is considered in [14] , [15] , and the case of coded side information is considered in [16] . Single-server multiuser PIR-SI problem wherein all users have the same demand but different side-information sets was considered in [17] .
In this work, we consider the following scenario. Suppose there are D users, each of which wants to privately retrieve a distinct message from a server. The users send their demands to a trusted agent, who is an entity that makes a profit by offering privacy to users. The agent has a subset of M messages whose indices are unknown to the server. This side information could have been obtained in several ways, e.g., from the current users and/or the users in the past, or from previous interactions with multiple (yet not-presentlyavailable) servers storing identical copies of the database. Followed by aggregating the users' requests, the agent then collectively retrieves information from the server.
One natural solution for the agent to achieve privacy during the retrieval is to successively use the PIR-SI protocol in [12] for each request. However, the agent can achieve much higher download rate while preserving the privacy collectively for all the users by using the multi-message PIR protocol in [14] , [15] . In this work, we introduce the notion of individual-privacy where the agent is required to protect the privacy only for each individual user, and we refer to this problem as Individually-Private Information Retrieval with Side Information (IPIR-SI). We seek to answer the following questions: is it possible to further increase the download rate when individual-privacy is required? Moreover, what are the fundamental limits on the download rate for the IPIR-SI problem? We answer the first question affirmatively and take the first steps towards answering the second question.
A. Main Contributions
We first establish a lower bound on the capacity (defined as the supremum of all achievable download rates) of the IPIR-SI problem by presenting a new protocol which builds up on the Generalized Partition and Code (GPC) protocol of [14] . Next, we characterize the capacity of IPIR-SI problem for M = 1 and D = 2. In the process of characterizing the capacity for arbitrary M and D we present a novel combinatorial conjecture, that may be of independent interest.
For M = 1 and arbitrary D, our conjecture, rephrased in the language of graph theory, relates the size of an external mother vertex-set of any directed graph G whose nodes have certain in-degree and out-degree, to the size of an internal mother vertex-set of the transpose of G, where the notions of external and internal mother vertex-sets are novel generalizations of the notion of mother vertex of a graph.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout, we denote random variables and their realizations by bold-face letters and regular letters, respectively.
For a prime q, let F q be a finite field of size q, and let F q l be an extension field of F q for some integer l ≥ 1.
Suppose there is a server storing a set of K messages, denoted by X ≜ {X i } i∈[K] , with each message X i being independently and uniformly distributed over F q l . That is,
. Also, suppose there are D users, each of which demands one distinct message X i . Let W be the index set of the demanded messages. The users send the indices of their demanded messages to a trusted agent, called aggregator,
Then, the aggregator retrieves the D messages X W ≜ {X i } i∈W from the server. We refer to W as the demand index set, X W as the demand, D as the demand size, S as the side information index set, X S as the side information, and M as the side information size.
Let W and S be the set of all D-subsets and all Msubsets of [K], respectively. We assume that S is distributed uniformly, i.e., Pr(S = S) = K M −1 for all S ∈ S; and W, conditional on S = S, is uniformly distributed, i.e.,
We assume that the server a priori knows the demand size D, the side information size M , the distribution of S and the conditional distribution of W given S. In contrast, the realizations S and W are unknown to the server a priori.
For any S, W , for retrieving X W the aggregator sends to the server a query Q [W,S] . The aggregator's query is a (potentially stochastic) function of W , S, and X S . The query Q [W,S] is required to protect the privacy of the demand index of every user individually from the server, i.e.,
. This condition is referred to as the individualprivacy condition. It should be noted that the individualprivacy condition is weaker than the joint-privacy condition, a.k.a. the W -privacy condition, being studied in [14] , where the privacy of all indices in the demand index set must be protected jointly. The notions of individual privacy and joint privacy coincide for D = 1, which was previously settled in [12] , and hence, in this work, we focus on D ≥ 2.
Upon receiving Q [W,S] , the server sends to the aggregator an answer A [W,S] . The server's answer is a deterministic function of the query Q [W,S] and the messages in X. In other words, (W, S) → (Q [W,S] , X) → A [W,S] forms a Markov chain, and H(A [W,S] |Q [W,S] , X) = 0. In addition, the answer A [W,S] along with the side information X S and the index sets W, S must enable the aggregator to retrieve the demand X W , i.e.,
This condition is referred to as the recoverability condition.
The problem is to design a protocol that, for any given W, S, generates a query Q [W,S] and its corresponding answer A [W,S] (given Q [W,S] and X) which satisfy both the privacy and recoverability conditions. We refer to this problem as single-server multi-message Individually-Private Information Retrieval with Side Information (IPIR-SI).
The rate of an IPIR-SI protocol is defined as the ratio of the entropy of the demand messages, i.e., DL, to the total entropy of the answer, i.e., H(A [W,S] ). The supremum of rates over all IPIR-SI protocols is defined as the capacity of the IPIR-SI problem. In this work, our goal is to characterize the capacity of the IPIR-SI problem, and to design an IPIR-SI protocol that achieves the capacity.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. Theorem 1 provides a lower bound on the capacity of IPIR-SI problem for M ≥ 1 and D ≥ 2, and Theorem 2 characterizes the capacity of IPIR-SI problem for the special case of M = 1 and D = 2. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are given in Sections IV and V, respectively.
The proof is based on constructing an IPIR-SI protocol that achieves the rate D(K − M ⌊K/(M + D)⌋) −1 or ⌈K/(M + D)⌉ −1 , depending on K, M , and D (see, for details, Section IV). This protocol, which is a variation of the Generalized Partition and Code (GPC) protocol previously proposed in [14] for single-server multi-message PIR-SI where joint-privacy is required, is referred to as GPC for Individual Privacy, or GPC-IP for short.
Remark 1.
A lower bound on the capacity of single-server multi-message PIR with side information, when the privacy of the demand indices must be protected jointly, was previously presented in [14, Theorem 1] . Surprisingly, this lower bound reduces to the lower bound of Theorem 1 where M (in [14, Theorem 1]) is replaced by M D. This correspondence implies that each message in the side information, when achieving individual-privacy, can be as effective as D side information messages when joint-privacy is required. This also suggests that, as one would expect, relaxing the privacy condition (from joint to individual) can increase the capacity. The proof of converse is based on new combinatorial and information-theoretic arguments, relying on two necessary conditions imposed by the individual-privacy and recoverability conditions (see Lemmas 2 and 3).
Remark 2. As we will show later, the tightness of the result of Theorem 1 for arbitrary M and D, which remains open in general, is subject to the correctness of a novel conjecture in combinatorics, formally stated in Section V, which may be of independent interest. Interestingly, for M = 1 and D ≥ 2, our conjecture relates the size of an external mother vertexset of any directed graph G, whose nodes have in-degree at least one and out-degree either zero or at least D, to the size of an internal mother vertex-set of the transpose of G. (The notions of external and internal mother vertex-sets, formally defined in Section V, are two generalizations of the notion of the mother vertex in graph theory.) In this work, we prove the simplest non-trivial case of this conjecture for M = 1 and D = 2, and leave the complete proof for the future work.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we propose an IPIR-SI protocol, referred to as Generalized Partition and Code for Individual Privacy (GPC-IP), achieving the rate lower bound of Theorem 1.
For simplifying the notation, we define
We assume that q ≥ α, and let ω 1 , . . . , ω α be α distinct elements from F q . (For q < α, the achievability of the rate lower bound of Theorem 1 remains open.)
GPC-IP Protocol: This protocol consists of four steps as follows:
Step 1: First, the aggregator constructs a set Q 0 of size ρ from the indices in [K], and β disjoint sets Q 1 , . . . , Q β (also disjoint from Q 0 ), each of size α, from the indices in [K], where the construction procedure is described below. There are two cases based on ρ: (i) ρ < D, and (ii) ρ ≥ D.
Case (i): With probability θ1 θ1+θ2 , the aggregator places ρ randomly chosen elements (demand indices) from W into Q 0 and the remaining elements of W along with all elements of S (side information indices) into Q 1 . Then the aggregator randomly places all other elements of [K] into Q 2 , . . . , Q β and the remaining positions in Q 1 ; otherwise, with probability θ2 θ1+θ2 , the aggregator places all elements of S ∪ W into Q 1 , and randomly places all other elements of [K] into Q 0 , Q 2 , . . . , Q β .
Case (ii): With probability θ1 θ1+θ3 , the aggregator places all elements of W along with ρ − D randomly chosen elements from S into Q 0 , and places the remaining elements of S together with all other elements of [K] into Q 1 , . . . , Q β at random; otherwise, with probability θ3 θ1+θ3 , the aggregator places all elements of S ∪ W into Q 1 , and randomly places all other elements of [K] into Q 0 , Q 2 , . . . , Q β .
Next, the aggregator creates a collection Q ′ of γ sequences Q ′ 1 , . . . , Q ′ γ , each of length ρ, such that
, and a collection Q ′′ of D sequences Q ′′ 1 , . . . , Q ′′ D , each of length α, such that
Step 2: The aggregator constructs Q * 0 = (Q 0 , Q ′ ) and Q * j = (Q j , Q ′′ ) for j ∈ [β], and sends to the server the query Q [W,S] = {Q * 0 , Q * σ −1 (1) , . . . , Q * σ −1 (β) } for a randomly chosen permutation σ : [β] → [β].
Step 3: By using Q * 0 = (Q 0 , Q ′ ) and Q * j = (Q j , Q ′′ ) for j ∈ [β], the server computes
The server then sends to the aggregator the answer
Step 4:
Upon receiving the answer from the server, the aggregator retrieves X i for i ∈ W ∩ Q 0 (or i ∈ W ∩ Q j for some j ∈ [β]) by subtracting off the contribution of the side information messages X S from the γ (or D) equations associated with A 0 (or A j ), and solving the resulting system of γ (or D) linear equations with γ (or D) unknowns. Lemma 1. The GPC-IP protocol is an IPIR-SI protocol, and achieves the rate Then, the rate is equal to D/(β + 1)D = ⌈ K M +D ⌉ −1 . The recoverability condition is obviously satisfied. For the proof of individual privacy, we need to show that for any Q ≜ {Q 0 , . . . , Q β } constructed by the protocol, Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q) is the same for all i ∈ [K]. Here we only give the proof for the case of ρ < D, and the proof for the case of ρ ≥ D can be found in [18] .
For simplifying the notation, let E denote the event {Q = Q}. For the case of ρ < D, Pr(i ∈ W|E) is given by
for all i ∈ Q 0 , and for all i ∈ Q j , j ∈ [β]. From (1) and (2), one can see that Pr(i ∈ W|E) is the same for all i ∈ Q 0 , say equal to p 0 , and is the same for all i ∈ Q j and all j ∈ [β], say equal to p 1 . We need to show that p 0 and p 1 are equal. Note that p 0 and p 1 are equal if the following two summations are equal:
W ⊂Qj : |W |=D,i∈W
For any W ⊂ Q j , |W |= D − ρ, and any S ⊂ Q j \ W , |S|= M , a simple counting yields
and accordingly, (3) is equal to
For any W ⊂ Q j , |W |= D such that i ∈ W , we have
and for any W ⊂ Q j , |W |= D − ρ such that i ∈ W , and any S ⊂ Q j \ W , |S|= M , we have
Accordingly, (4) is equal to
It is easy to verify that (3) and (4) are equal for the choice of θ 1 and θ 2 defined as in the protocol.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we first present a new combinatorial conjecture which, if holds, proves the tightness of the result of Theorem 1. Next, we prove the simplest non-trivial case of this conjecture, yielding the tightness of the capacity lower bound in Theorem 1 for M = 1 and D = 2.
Before stating the conjecture, we give two necessary conditions, due to individual-privacy and recoverability, which are essential to relate the IPIR-SI problem to our conjecture.
Proof: The proof is by the way of contradiction, and is omitted for brevity.
Conjecture 1. For any good mapping f , there exists
For M = 1 and D ≥ 2, the statement of Conjecture 1 can be rephrased in the language of graph theory as follows. Let G = (V, E) be an arbitrary directed graph (without parallel edges), where V and E are the set of nodes and edges of G, respectively. Denote by d in (v) and d out (v) the in-degree and out-degree of node v ∈ V , respectively, over G. We define an external (or respectively, internal) mother vertex-set of G as a minimal subset I * of nodes in V from which all other nodes u in V \ I * such that d out (u) ∕ = 0 (or respectively, d in (u) ∕ = 0) can be reached (i.e., for any u ∈ V \ I * , d out (u) ∕ = 0 (or respectively, d in (u) ∕ = 0), there exists v ∈ I * such that there is a directed path from v to u in G), and denote the size of an external (or respectively, internal) mother vertexset I * of G by µ ext (G) (or respectively, µ int (G)). Also, let G T be the transpose of G, which is formed by reversing the direction of all edges in G (i.e.,
Note that the upper bound on |I * | in Conjecture 1 reduces to ⌊ K D+1 ⌋ for M = 1. This is because K − D⌈ K D+1 ⌉ ≤ ⌊ K D+1 ⌋ for any D ≤ K − 1. Moreover, for any D-graph G = (V, E) on K nodes, we can define f (v) for any v ∈ V as the set of all nodes (including v) that can be reached from node v (via a directed path in G). Then, it is easy to verify that f satisfies the conditions (i)-(iv) for a good mapping. Note also that µ ext (G) represents the size of a (minimal) subset I * ⊆ V such that ∪ v∈I * f (v) = V . This shows the equivalence between Conjectures 1 and 2 for M = 1.
In the following, we prove Conjecture 2 for M = 1 and D = 2, and hence the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. For any 2-graph G on K nodes, µ ext (G) ≤ ⌊ K 3 ⌋. Proof: Let G be an arbitrary 2-graph on K nodes. Suppose that µ ext (G) > ⌊ K 3 ⌋. We need to show a contradiction. Let n ≜ µ ext (G). Consider an arbitrary partition of the nodes in G into n parts, V 1 , . . . , V n , such that each part V j contains a node v j from which all other nodes in V j can be reached. (Note that a node in a part can potentially reach some other nodes in other parts.) Obviously, I * ≜ {v 1 , . . . , v n } is an external mother vertex-set of G.
By the minimality of I * , it follows that no node v j can be reached from any node out of the part V j . (Otherwise, from the nodes in I * \ {v j } all other nodes can be reached, and this contradicts the minimality of I * .) Since d in (v j ) ≥ 1 (by definition), then there must exist another node u j in V j that reaches v j . Also, no part V j can contain only a single node v j , simply because d in (v j ) ≥ 1, and the node v j can be reached from some other node(s) in some other part(s), which again contradicts the minimality of I * .
